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Canonical Defamation in
Medieval England
by R. H. HELMHOLZ*
It is a commonplace of legal history to say that defamation was
a spiritual offense in medieval England.' Slanderous words gave
rise to a cause of action in the ecclesiastical courts. This article is
meant to supply some information on that action as it appears in
the surviving records of England's Church courts. One of the difficulties of most modern treatments of the subject is that they must
rely heavily on the rules of the royal courts about the proper sphere
of ecclesiastical jurisdiction.2 That is the theme of the early Year
Book cases. But it is necessarily second-hand evidence. Substantial
numbers of actual Church court records are available, although
they are unprinted and scattered in archives throughout England.
It seems worthwhile to make use, even if it must sometimes be a
tentative use, of their testimony on the actual working of the law of
defamation in the Church courts.

Discussion of the substantive law may be prefaced with some
statistics. Absolute certainty as to how far any figures are representative is, of course, impossible to obtain. The extent of record sur*Department of History, Washington University, St. Louis.
1. E.g., ". ..

le cas de diffamation

est tout spirituel

offence,

qui ne

poit auterment estre puni forsqe la." Y.B. Trin. 12 Hen. VII f. 24b (1497).
See also Y.BB. Trin. 17 Edw. IV, f. 4, pl. 2 (1477); Mich. 27 Hen. VIII,
f. 14, pl. 4 (1535). For modern comments see W. Holdsworth, A History
of English Law, 5th ed. (London, 1942), v. 3, p. 410-11; F. Pollock and
F.W. Maitland, The History of English Law, 2d ed. (Cambridge, 1968),
v. 2, p. 536-37; C.H.S. Fifoot, History and Sources of the Common Law,
Tort and Contract (1949), 126-28; E. Garth Moore, An Introduction to
English Canon Law (1967), 4; S.F.C. Milsom, Historical Foundations of
the Common Law (1969), 333-35.
2. In addition to the references given above, see Van Vechten Veeder,
"The History of the Law of Defamation," Select Essays in Anglo-American
Legal History (1909), v. 3, p. 446-73; J.C. Courtney, "Absurdities of the
Law of Slander and Libel," 36 American L. Rev. 552-64 (1902). But cf.
A.K.R. Kiralfy, A Source Book of English Law (1957), 391-400, which
contains translations of ecclesiastical records.
255
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vival is too spotty. But what has survived suggests that defamation
cases were always a significant part of litigation in the English
Church courts. In the Consistory court of Rochester, for example,
seventeen of ninety cases heard in 1438 were actions for defamation.3 Between Michaelmas 1491 and the same term in 1493, the
official principal of Hereford heard twelve such suits, out of a total
of 176.4 At Lichfield in the years 1465 through 1467 forty-five of
259 actions introduced were defamation actions.5 And the Canterbury Commissary Court heard eight of these suits in 1373, out
of a total number of 113.6 Defamation actions thus never represented the major item of business. But they were a regular and
important part of canonical litigation throughout the later medieval
period.
The legal foundation for these actions of defamation was, in
the Province of Canterbury, a constitution enacted by the Council
of Oxford in 1222.7
omnes illos qui gratia odii, lucri, vel
Excommunicamus
favoris, vel alia quacunque de causa malitiose crimen imponunt alicui, cum infamatus non sit apud bonos et graves, ut
sic saltem ei purgatio indicatur vel alio modo gravetur.
all those who, for the sake of hatred,
We excommunicate
profit, or favor, or for whatever cause, maliciously impute a
crime to any person who is not of ill fame among good and
serious men, by means of which at least purgation is awarded
to him or he is harmed in some other manner.
A variant version was adopted in the diocese of York, but it did not
3. Taken from Kent County Record Office, Maidstone, Act book
DRb/Pa 1.
4. Episcopal Archives, Cathedral Library, Consistory Court Act book
I/ 1.
5. Joint Record Office, Lichfield, Act book B/ C/ 1/ 1.
6. Dean and Chapter Library, Canterbury, Act book Y.1.1. Numbers
of defamation suits increased in the fifteenth century; from the middle of
the century there were usually fifty a year. See B. Woodcock, Medieval
Ecclesiastical Courts in the Diocese of Canterbury (1952), 88. Dr. R.W.
Dunning has calculated that defamation suits came to about one-fifth of
the total in the Wells Consistory court; see "The Wells Consistory Court
in the Fifteenth Century," Proceedings of the Somersetshire Archaeological and Natural History Soc., Vol. 106 (1962), p. 59.
7. F.M. Powicke and C.R. Cheney, eds., Councils and Synods with
other Documents relating to the English Church, II, A.D. 1205-1313,
(1964) v. 1, p. 107. For medieval commentary, see W. Lyndwood, Provinciale V, 17, c. Auctoritate Dei Patris (Oxford, 1679), 345-48.
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differ in any legally important aspect.8 Court records show the
uniform application of this remedy. English formularies invariably
give documents based on the Oxford constitution.9 And the libels
and sentences from the court records show the same use of the
provincial or diocesan action.'"
A particularly interesting case comes from the late thirteenth
century Canterbury records. The complainant
apparently had
brought his original action at the papal court. As was normal, this
resulted in the delegation of papal jurisdiction to a local cleric, in
this case an English prior. The rescript of delegation, specifying
the terms of law by which the prior was to decide the case, did not
mention the constitution of Oxford. But the libel in the actual trial
was quite specific. The defendant was alleged to have fallen "in
sentenciam maioris excommunicationis
in consilio Oxon' contra
tales diffamatores latam." 11 Even here, the Provincial constitution provided the framework for the hearing. The wording of that
constitution determined the scope of the remedy for defamation
available in the English Church courts.
All defamation actions had, therefore, to be based on the precise wording of the constitution. It determined, in the first place,
what words were actionable. The statute specified that the language
must have imputed a crime to the complainant. The cases bear this
out. It was defamatory to call someone a thief, as in a London action
where a man said, "Thow art the woman that stolest the kyetyll from
8. Councils and Synods, I, 496 for York; II, 820 for Durham, which follows the Southern model.
9. The precise language of the Constitution is repeated in these
formularies: British Museum, Reg. II A XI, fols. 6v-7r; Harl. MS. 2179,
fols. 65v-66r; Inner Temple Library, London, Petyt MS. 511.3, f. 106v;
Dean and Chapter Library, Canterbury, MS. D 8, f. 9r.
10. A typical sentence in a defamation action begins: "Idcirco nos commissarius antedictus solum Deum pre oculis habentes, prefatam Johannam Pope in maioris excommunicationis sentenciam contra huiusmodi
diffamatores in constitutione provincie Cant' que sic incipit ex auctoritate
dei patris etc. .

.

. incidisse

pronunciamus

et declaramus."

Canterbury,

Act book Y.1.5, f. 47v (1456). York documents speak of falling "in maioris
excommunicationis sentenciam contra huiusmodi diffamatores latam et
promulgatam auctoritate constitutionis synodalis Ebor'." Borthwick
Institute, Cause papers R VII F 100 (1431). Cause papers are the formal
documents used in the course of litigation, recording the pleadings, the
evidence, and the judgment. As presently arranged at the Borthwick
Institute, each file, with a few exceptions, contains the papers for a
separate case. See J. Purvis, The Archives of York Diocesan Registry, St.
Anthony's Hall Publications, No. 2 (1952), 13-14,
11. Canterbury, Ecclesiastical Suits, No. 70 (1288).
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the Old Swan." 12 It was actionable to name another man as a
"public perjurer", as in a Canterbury case from 1373.13 Likeof forgery,14
of heresy,'• of manufacturing
wise, imputation
false evidence,'6 of adultery,'7 of procuring the death of an
innocent man1' were all actionable.
On the other hand, it was not defamatory to call a woman a
"scalde", since this involved no crime.19 Nor apparently was the
mere insult of naming another "serviens unius rustici" without
more.20 Some of the phrases one finds in the court books were
doubtless nothing but common insults. To shout that a woman was
12. Guildhall Library, London, Deposition book MS. 9065, f. 204r
(1494). Allegations of theft were frequently the basis for defamation suits.
Examples are: Canterbury, Act books Y.1.3, f. 148v (1420); X.1.1, f. 129v
(1457); Rochester, Act book DRb/ Pa 2, f. 64r (1447); Hereford, Act book
0/2, p. 31 (1442); York, Cause papers R VII E 170 (1364); R VII F 27
(1406); Depositions and other Ecclesiastical Proceedings from the Courts
of Durham from 1311 to the Reign of Elizabeth, ed. J. Raine, Surtees Soc.,
Vol. 21 (1845), 27.
13. Act book Y.1.1, f. 25r: "fuit perjurius publicus in depositione sua
in causa matrimoniali."
14. Canterbury, Ecclesiastical Suits, No. 70 (1288); York, Cause papers
R VII F 100 (1431): "usus fuit in emptione et venditione falso auro et lege
regis reprobato."
15. London, Deposition book MS. 9065, f. 215v (1494); Norwich, Norfolk Record Office, Deposition book DEP/ 1, f. 14v (1500): '"Thow art an
heretik and a Lollard."
16. Rochester, Act book DRb/ Pa 1, f. 123v (1439): "imponendo ei
quod ipse falsas evidencias fabricasset."
17. Ely, "Registrum Primum," Cambridge University Library, EDR
D/ 2/1, f. 21v (1375): "imponendo sibi crimen adulterii." Canterbury,
Sede Vacante Scrapbook III, No. 270 (1290); York, Minster Library Court
Book M 2 (1)f, f. 27r (1389); Act Book of the Ecclesiastical Court of
Whalley, ed. A.M. Cooke, Chetham Soc., Vol. 44, N.S. (1901), 17-20.
18. York, Cause papers R VII E 59 (1347).
19. Canterbury, Act book Y.1.1, f. 22v (1372). In this case, proceedings
were suspended and a day assigned ad concordandum when the complainant could allege only this word as defamatory matter. Ordinarily a
day would have been assigned ad libellandum. But cf., for two apparently
contrary cases, Acts of the Collegiate Church of SS. Peter and Wilfrid,
Ripon, A.D. 1452 to A.D. 1506, ed. J.T. Fowler, Surtees Soc., Vol. 64
(1874), 2, 58. And for some post-Reformation cases, see R.A. Marchant,
The Church under the Law; Justice, Administration and Discipline in the
Diocese of York, 1560-1640 (1969), 71-74.
20. York, Cause papers R VII E 72 (1356). In this case, although the
record is not unambiguous, proceedings seem to have continued only after
the complainant added to the original allegation. She noted that the defendant had also called her meretrix sacerdotis.
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a "strong harlot" was probably no more than a term of general
abuse.21 But the words technically included a crime punishable
in a public court. Therefore they were enough to give rise to a
claim for defamation. Words which were merely abusive were not.
It was not necessary, however, that the crime be actually
named or unequivocally stated. If the words implied the commission of a crime, this was enough. The doctrine of mitior sensus
which complicated the early Common Law remedy found no place
in the canon law courts.22 To say, for example, "I see a monk at
the door of the priory of Rochester who did not lie in his own bed
that night," while a monk was standing in the doorway, gave rise
to a cause of action in a Rochester case of 1462.23 It implied the
monk's incontinence. Similarly, for a man to say that he had found
a woman "lying together with Richard Porter in a barn with the
doors closed," was enough to allow the woman to sue for defamation. That the words could be construed to imply something other
than fornication was apparently no defense.24 In an interesting
York case from 1424, Thomas More was cited for claiming to have
spoken with 'the spirit of a dead man. The spirit had ordered him,
he claimed, to tell the dead man's son to restore property wrongfully taken from More. This had been sufficient, it seems, to have
given rise to common fame that the dead man had stolen the goods.
To clear the dead man's name, More was required to do public penance during divine service. He had to announce to the local congregation that he had falsely defamed the dead man.25
Considerable latitude was thus allowed in the degree of specificity with which the crime had to be named. Because of this fact,
the canonical remedy for defamation covered a broader range of
insulting words than might at first appear. The number of human
21. The term is many times repeated in the late fifteenth century
Londonrecords. See Guildhall, Act book MS. 9064/ 1 (1470-73).
22. On this rule, under which defendants sought to escape liability by
claiming that their words could technically be construed so as not to constitute a crime, see Milsom, Historical Foundations, 338; Prosser, Handbook on Torts ?106 (3d ed., 1964), 764.

23. Act Book DRb/ Pa 3, f. 442r: It is worth noting that the defendant
sought unsuccessfully to claim lack of specificity: "Fatetur quod talia
dixit, sed quod non nominavit aliquam personam in specialem."
24. Rochester, Act book DRb/ Pa 4, f. 304v (1496): "inveniebat eam
in orreo simul cum RicardoPorteriacentem suspective et clausis hostiis."
25. York, Borthwick Institute, Act book R VII Cons. AB 2, f. 40v
(1424). A somewhat similar case, in which the slander originated with
a woman who was dead at the time of the action, is referredto in a letter
from Henry Dispenser, bishop of Norwich from 1370 to 1406; see M.

Dominica

Legge, ed., Anglo-Norman

Norman Text Soc., Vol. 3 (1941), 383-84.

Letters and Petitions,
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actions punishable as crimes of some sort in medieval England was
considerable. Allegations of professional incompetence were unfortunately not included. Only very rarely would they have included
a crime. And I have found no examples in the surviving Act books.
This must be counted as one of the real lacks in the Church court
action. But the allegation of criminal conduct, in actual practice,
still embraced a large amount of the defamatory language of daily
life.
No distinction was made between crimes punishable by the
secular courts and those punishable by the Church. The royal
courts were developing the rule that if the crime were one they
alone could try, a writ of prohibition would lie.26 Under this doctrine, defamation in the ecclesiastical tribunals would be limited
to the imputation of distinctly spiritual crimes--heresy, adultery
and the like. Allegations of theft and homicide could not be dealt
with by the Church courts. But, whatever the developed Common
Law rule, ecclesiastical practice did not conform to it in the Middle
Ages. All crimes were treated alike in defamation actions.27 And
the court records show negligible numbers of prohibitions interrupting suits for defamation. The Church courts went their way
largely unmolested in this area.
English Common lawyers had an apparently good reason for
allowing a royal writ of prohibition where the imputation was of
a purely secular crime. Without such a prohibition, they reasoned,
a canonical action for defamation could be brought against a man
who had accused another of a crime in the royal courts. To subject
such an accuser or indictor to a defamation action was surely an
abuse. It was an indirect attack on the royal courts themselves. A
statute of 1327 and several cases found in the Year Books and plea
rolls can be found prohibiting the practice.28
26. Y.BB. Trin. 22 Edw. IV, f. 20, pl. 47 (1483); Mich. 27 Hen. VIII,
f. 14, pl. 4 (1535); Co. Lit. 96 b. In one fourteenth century formulary,

beside the forms for defamation by calling another a thief is written in

a later hand: "Quere an hodie curia ecclesiastica de hiis diffamacionibus
cognoscat." London, Inner Temple Library, Petyt MS. 511.3, f. 35r.
27. See also Woodcock, Medieval Ecclesiastical Courts in the Diocese
of Canterbury, 88.
28. I Edw. III, st. 2, c. 11. In a case from 1358, for example, a prohibition issued to stop ecclesiastical proceedings against jurors for their
verdict in a royal court. London, Public Record Office, K.B. 27/392,
Rex m. 18. See also: W.R. Jones, "Relations of the two Jurisdictions:
Conflict and Cooperation in England during the thirteenth and
fourteenth centuries," Studies in Medieval and Renaissance History,
VII (1970), 201-202; H. Potter, An Historical Introduction to English
Law and its Institutions (1932), 360.
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But it is another question whether the ecclesiastical courts
habitually entertained such abusive actions. The Constitution of
Oxford specifically required that the imputation be made maliciously. Lyndwood, glossing that word, gave it as a rule that accusations made and proved in the course of legal proceedings did not
fall within the wording of the Constitution.29 By definition, they
were not made maliciously. He drew no distinction between secular
and ecclesiastical jurisdictions. Neither, it would seem from Lyndwood's treatment, would give rise to a defamation action.
The actual court records, while not so full here as one could
wish, suggest that Lyndwood's rule was observed in practice. In a
Rochester defamation action brought for imputation of theft, the
complaint was dismissed when the defendant showed that his only
offense consisted of having brought an action for wrongful conversion against the complainant.30 In another case, an archdeacon
sued for defamation successfully pleaded that his accusation of
adultery against the complainant had been made in the course of
a judicial action. He had been merely carrying out his duties.31
There is a case from York in 1364 where an action for defamation
was allowed after a secular prosecution for theft. But it was also
shown that in the secular court the complainant had established
his innocence. Notwithstanding that fact, the defendant had repeatedly uttered his accusations of theft. He was apparently dissatisfied with the judgment vindicating the complainant. Here the
Church court allowed a remedy.32
This is not to say, of course, that no actions based on the previous indictment or suit at Common Law were ever entertained in
the ecclesiastical courts. Surely they were. Lyndwood's gloss does
in fact leave room for actions against an unsuccessful accuser
who acted out of malice towards an innocent man. But even leaving this case aside, one must recognize that the procedure of the
Church courts could be used against innocent men as well as the
procedure of the royal courts. Complicated court systems nearly
always leave room for abuse. But the requirement of malice was an
attempt, within the canon law itself, to deal with that abuse. And
29. Provinciale, V, 17, c. Auctoritate Dei s.v. malitiose: "Quia vocat
quis aliquem latronem, perjurum, homicidam, vel adulterum, et hoc dicit
in judicio per viam accusationis, vel dununciationis, et id probaverit,
non incidit in hanc poenam."
30. Act book DRb/Pa 2, fols. 246r-246v (1454): "Et quantum ad
crimen furti, dicit quod non imposuit sibi crimen furti nec aliquid dixit
maliciose de eodem, sed peciit et vendicavit unum flameolum quod fuit
uxoris sue et quod idem Willelmus habuit quo iure ignorat."
31. Canterbury, Sede Vacante Scrapbook III, No. 270 (1290).
32. York, Cause papers R VII E 170.
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the records do not indicate that the Church encouraged large numbers of actions against Common Law indictors. It is dangerous to
take the Common Lawyers' objections to a practice, and to draw
the conclusion that the practice was the norm in the Church courts.
For the legal historian, it is noteworthy that defamation by
prior judicial action was excluded from coverage by the Oxford
constitution's requirement of malice. The necessity of malice in the
later Common Law remedy, as modem commentators often note,
has given rise to considerable difficulties, not wholly resolved by
legal fictions developed over the course of time.33 It would be
rash, until more research has been done on the growth of defamation in the royal courts, to say categorically that this requirement
came into English law by way of the canon law. I can do no more
than suggest that English law may have included the requirement
of malice because it incorporated this part of the canonical action.
It is at least a strong possibility.
To say this, of course, attaches no blame to the canon law
remedy. The requirement of malice was not at all out of place in
the Church courts. Since, as we shall see, the punishment of the
defamer was varied according to his guilt and to the degree of harm
he had caused, it was quite relevant for the judge to know with
what malice a defendant had acted. In a London case of 1495, for
example, we learn that after accusing a woman of giving birth to
a priest's child, William Strome immediately thought better of it.
He apologized for his words. He asked for the woman's pardon.34
Or, to take the opposite case, in the York court one defendant was
said to have remarked after his initial accusation, "What I saw I
wish to say and never to deny." 35 In another case, it was relevant that the imputation had been made repeatedly (iteratibus
vicibus) and not just in the heat of anger (non tantum calore ira-

cundie).36 All these were important in assessing the seriousness of the ill fame, the extent of its spread, and the proper remedy
for its public correction.
According to the Oxford constitution, the complainant in a
defamation action had to show some sort of harm. At least, it reads,
33. See, for example, the interesting article "Slander and Libel," 6
American L. Rev., 593-613 (1872), in which the doctrine of legal malice
is called, at 610, "pure scholasticism." And see, for early history, W.
Holdsworth, "Defamation in the 16th and 17th Centuries," 41 L. Q. Rev.
(1925) 24-28.
34. Deposition book MS. 9065, f. 227v.
35. Cause papers R VII E 171.
36. Cause papers R VII F 61 (1411).
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he must have been put to a canonical purgation as a result.37 In
practice, such a purgation often became merely a preliminary to a
defamation action. A man, alleging that a crime had wrongfully
been imputed to him, came before the judge and "asked to purge
himself of that crime." 38 Or a judge might assign purgation
because of widespread public fame.39 If the defamed person successfully purged himself, an action for defamation, tried like any
other instance case, could begin. This sort of purgation was an
entirely normal part of canon law where there was public fame of
a crime.40 The English action for defamation built on that procedure.
In practice then, no actual damages had to be shown where
purgation was used. But allegations of actual damages were by no
means uncommon. They were again relevant to assessing the
amount of harm done and the proper way of restoring a complainant to good fame. Thus we find in the libel and articles claims that
the words had "caused the complainant to lose his goods," ' or
that he had "sustained several labors, expenses and vexations on
account of the imposition of this crime," 42 or that a woman's
husband had "refused to admit her to his bed as he was accustomed
to" 43on account of the slanderous words.
Conversely, defendants sometimes answered that no damage
had in fact occurred. In a York case of 1356, for example, it was
said that the complainant was "of no worse fame after the utterance
than before." 44 As this suggests, the most frequent defense to
defamation actions was the existence of prior defamation. If a man
had been previously and publicly reputed to be guilty of the same
37. On this see the discussion in Lyndwood, Provinciale, V, 17, c.
Auctoritate

Dei s.v. ut sic.

38. Lincoln, Diocesan Record Office, Court book Cj/1 (1493-1504), f.
18r; Canterbury, Act book Y.1.3, f. 148v (1418).
39. Canterbury, Act book Y.1.2, f. 10r (1397), Hereford, Act book 0/2,
31 (1442); Rochester, Act book DRb/Pa 2, f. 175v (1452).
40. See X 5.34.1, 5, Corpus Juris Canonici, ed. A. Friedberg (Leipzig,
1879-81).
41. London, Deposition book MS. 9065, f. 27v (1487): "Causaverunt
ipsum perdere bona sua."
42. Ibid., f. 88r (1490): "sustinuit nunnullos labores expensas et
vexaciones pretextu imposicionis huiusmodi criminis."
43. Canterbury, Ecclesiastical Suits, No. 318 (c. 1290): "'dictus
dominus Robertus maritus suus eo pretextu noluit ipsam ut uxorem ad

lectum suum aliqualiter admittere . . . prout prius consuevit."
44. Cause papers R VII E 72: ". . . fama et status dicte Alicie non
sunt multum lesi nec in aliquo deteriorati.
. . . quia non audivit eam

ut dicit reputari per aliquos deterioris fame post quam fuerat ante."
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crime, then the act of repeating the rumor did not fall within the
Constitution. It required that the ill repute have originated with the
defendant. And thus we find defenses like this one: "These words
did not have their origin (from him); but common voice and fame
held these things long before he uttered the words." 45 Lyndwood remarked on the frequent use made of this defense in the
Church courts. He noted that it led to unfortunate results, since it
allowed a man to greatly augment the extent of publication, to enlarge the damage caused, and then to escape punishment by pleading prior defamation.46 The cases do not, unfortunately, reveal
to what extent the judges overcame this difficulty. Lyndwood's
words suggest that they did not.

To turn now more directly to the question of punishment or
damages, we are met with a second instance of possible dispute
over jurisdiction. The writ, or so-called statute, Circumspecte
Agatis (1286) limited the Church courts to spiritual penalties in
defamation. No money damages were to be available.47 An
opening was, however, left open. After a successful prosecution, a
defendant might receive a corporal penance, then redeem it for
a money payment. But it had to be according to his wishes, not
consequent upon a formal sentence by the judge.48 Otherwise,
the action could be prohibited by the royal courts.
So far as the ecclesiastical records indicate, this limitation
was followed in practice. No money damages, beyond the expenses
normal in canonical litigation, were awarded in the formal sentences. Nor were they demanded in the libels. Public penance and
45. Canterbury, Act book Y.1.3, f. 171r (1421); York, Cause papers R
VII E 59 (1347); and see the formula for raising the defense: British
Museum, Reg. 11 A XI, f. 60r.
46. Lyndwood, Provinciale, V, 17, c. Auctoritate Dei s.v. unde: "Si
prius fuerit infamatus super eodem crimine, tunc non haberet locum ista
poena, et sic practizant multi, qui ad evadendum hanc poenam dicunt,
quod prius fuit infamatus super eodem crimine sibi imposito: sed mihi
videtur quod ista litera non sit bona, et propterea quod practica non sit
bona."
47. Statutes of the Realm, I, 101; Councils and Synods, II, 974-75;
and see E.B. Graves, "Circumspecte Agatis," English Historical Rev., Vol.
43 (1928), 1-20.
48. "In diffamacionibus libere corrigant prelati non obstante prohibicione, primo iniungendo penam corporalem quam si reus redimere
velit libere recipiat prelatus pecuniam licet regia prohibicio porrigatur."
Statutes of the Realm, v. 1, p. 102.
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other "spiritual" penalties alone are detailed in the remaining
documents.
Whether this is a direct consequence of the availability of a
writ of prohibition is not entirely clear. The Constitution, it should
be remembered, spoke only of the excommunication of an offender.
It offered, in other words, only a spiritual penalty. It can thus be
argued that the canon law remedy gave no direct money damages
in the first place. Of course, this is true in a sense of all canonical
actions. Excommunication was the severest penalty in the canon
law.49 Even in actions brought to enforce contracts, the suits for
breach of faith which filled the English Church courts in the Middle Ages, the sanction for refusal to fulfill a contract was always
excommunication. But it may be that there were special reasons
within the canon law itself for limiting defamation actions to spiritual penalties. Quite apart from the limitations of the English law,
there were practical reasons for avoiding the routine award of
damages in the formal sentences.
First, a formal excommunication followed by informal bargaining about restitution to the injured party in exchange for the
lifting of the sentence was an entirely suitable way of handling
defamation cases. The number of variables in these actions was
very large. There was something to be said for leaving the question
of restitution and penance open, as the Constitution did. Then,
after the sentence of excommunication, could come discussion of
under what circumstances the sentence should be lifted. This
might involve a money payment to the complainant, or it might not.
But in any case, the penance or damages would be in return for
the lifting of a sentence of excommunication. This was in harmony
with both Circumspecte Agatis and the canon law of defamation.
It cannot, of course, be absolutely proved that this is what normally happened. Any bargaining about penance and its commutation which went on was not made part of the record. It is beyond
recall. But certainly it is fair to say that the rules about damages
imposed by the royal courts did not conflict directly with the ecclesiastical law of defamation itself. The Constitution of Oxford did not
promise money damages. As such, the limitations of Circumspecte
Agatis may not have been so stringent or restrictive of the Church
courts as is sometimes said.
Second, the use of a broad range of "spiritual" penalties was
actually a strength of the ecclesiastical courts' handling of defamation cases. At least this is true if one compares it to the later Common Law action. One of the handicaps of the modern law of libel
49. On this and the English Church'sprivilege of demanding capture

of excommunicates by royal justice see F.D. Logan, Excommunication
and the Secular Arm in Medieval England (1968), 13-15.
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and slander is that it is limited to money damages.50 Though
courts today may consider the degree of fault by the defendant and
the nature of harm to the plaintiff in assessing a proper amount of
recovery, they are still, so to speak, stuck with strictly monetary
damages. These are often of extreme difficulty to assess accurately.
And they are sometimes quite other than what a plaintiff really
needs or desires. What he wants is a public vindication of his
reputation, an official declaration of his innocence and a public
admission of error by the defamer. He wants, in short, a restoration
to the good opinion of the community. No doubt, in the conditions
of modern society, anything but money damages are impossible.
But as a tool to restore a man's tarnished reputation, they are a
blunt instrument indeed.
The ecclesiastical remedy in the Middle Ages, whatever its
other limitations, fulfilled this function better than the later Common Law action. Sometimes, we find in the records, the complainant was content with a simple sentence of the court upholding his
innocence. The judge "restored him to good fame." ~' Church
courts were, by and large, local courts, and in a small community,
where gossip moved freely and spread quickly, a simple sentence
was sometimes enough. If necessary, an oath by the defendant
might be added. He was occasionally obliged to swear publicly
that he would not repeat the scandalous charge.52 In some
cases this oath was backed by a guarantee of a money penalty to
ensure future good behavior.53
50. On this see Alec Samuels, "Problemsof Assessing Damages for
Defamation," 79 L. Q. Rev., 63-86 (1963). See also E.C.S. Wade,
"Defamation," 66 L. Q. Rev., 348-57 (1950). Wade in fact suggests, at
354-56, the adoption of some of the same sorts of remedies used in the
medieval Church courts.
51. E.g., "Dominus commissarius declaravit se bene purgatum, male
diffamatum et restituit eum bone fame quantum in se fuit." Canterbury,
Act book Y.1.3, f. 15v (1415). A similar formula is found in the British
Museum formulary, Harl. Misc. 2179, f. 68v.
52. E.g., Canterbury, Act book Y.1.3, f. 54v (1417): "iurata est dicta
Matilda de loquendo omnem honestatem de dicta Margareta in futuro."
Canterbury,

Act book Y.1.4, f. 103r (1422): ". . . quod habeat se honesto

tam in verbis quam in gestura erga vicarium." See also London,
Deposition book MS. 9065, f. 70r (1490).
53. In a case from 1417, the defendant was ordered not to defame the
complainant in the future under penalty of twenty shillings, a third of
which was to go to the defamed person, a third to the parish church,
and a third to the prior of Canterbury, in whose court the action had
been heard. Canterbury, Act book Y.1.3, f. 200v. In a York action of
1400, the same oath was ordered, the penalty again being twenty
shillings. York, Minster Library Court book M 2 (1) f, f. 32r. See also
Acts of the Collegiate Church of SS. Peter and Wilfrid, Ripon, 46-47.
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In some defamation actions, the remedy was more elaborate.
The order from a York case, for example, called for the defendant
"at the time of High Mass, the parishioners being present (to) say
in a loud and intelligible voice that he had erred in his words,
which were uttered from false information of others, and (to)
humbly ask pardon" of the complainant.54 In a Hereford action,
the defendant had again to publicly ask pardon during divine
service and to say "that he had uttered the words out of evil will,
not from zealousness, and that he had been moved by anger." 55
It is not romanticism, I think, to suggest that penalties such as
these more effectively restored an injured reputation than the
award of money damages would have. Perhaps many litigants
would have preferred a pecuniary penalty. But that is not necessarily a criticism of the canonical action. Its aim was to punish unjust slander and to undo its effects, not to reward the avarice of
litigants.
Most defamation cases, however, never reached the stage of
sentence and penance. I have no exact figures, but certainly the
large majority ended in compromise and agreement. The notation
"pax" written alongside a case in the Act book marked a frequent
end.56 The continuance "sub spe concordie" was another.57
A concord could be admitted even after formal sentencing where
the parties had reached subsequent agreement.58 The Church
courts were never concerned to push defamation actions through to
formal sentence. No special license to concord was demanded.
One of the principal goals of any legal system must be to bring
quarrelling people to amicable settlement. Surely this is true where
insulting and damaging words have been the substance of the
quarrel. So far as the court records indicate, it was this goal which
54. ". . . quod tempore celebracionis

maioris misse,

parochianis

congregatis, alta et intelligibili voce, dicat ipsum erronee huiusmodi
verba per ipsum alias dicta ex falsa informacione aliorum dixisse et
quod veniam postulet humiliter ab eodem." Borthwick Institute, Act book
R. As. 55, f. 6v (1497). In another York case the defendant had to stand
at the altar and say, "Ago pro eo quod Aniciam Stenys de Ebor nequiter
diffamavi, a qua peto benevolenciam pro commissis." Act book R VII
Cons. A B 2, f. 45v (1425).
55. ". . . quod veniret

tempore

alte misse

ad pulpetum

et ibidem

publice peteret misericordiam a dicto domino Johanne et quod
protulisset huiusmodi verba ex mala voluntate et non ex bono zelo, sed
iracundia motus fuisset." Act book 0/2, 50 (1442).
56. Lichfield, B/C/1/1, f. 39v (1465); Hereford, Act book 0/2, 20, 69
(1442); Ely "Registrum Primum," f. 80r (1378).
57. Rochester, Act book DRb/Pa 1, f. 27r (1437); Canterbury, Act
books Y.1.1, f. 51r (1373); Y.1.3, f. 54r (1417).
58. Canterbury, Act book Y.1.4, f. 112v (1423).
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predominated in the Church courts in defamation cases. The
Common Law limitation to purely spiritual punishment did not
severely hamper the Church courts in this task. And it was a task
of some consequence and value.

It is too soon, as Professor Milsom has recently noted, to write
the full history of early defamation at Common Law.59 A good
deal is already known, of course.60 But only the painstaking
examination of the early sixteenth century plea rolls will tell the
story of the development of the secular remedy. The process will
certainly have to be studied against the background of the canon
law action outlined above. Comparison with canonical practice
should illuminate the process by which the royal courts assimilated,
or half-assimilated, the ecclesiastical action. It may be that some
of the defects and anomalies of the Common Law remedy existed
solely because they were taken over whole from the canon law.61
Even if this is true, however, it will not prove an equal weakness in the canonical action. That action was by no means perfect
from a strictly legal standpoint. The failure to include allegations
of professional incompetence and the too ready availability of the
defense of prior defamation must be counted as faults in the law.
But, when this has been said, the records tell a largely positive
story. The Church courts took in a large class of defamatory language, they considered a broad range of evidence, and they made
available a varied set of remedies. The records, examined here,
suggest that the Church courts provided a useful remedy for men
injured by harsh and insulting words.

59. Milsom, Historical Foundations, 334.
60. See Holdsworth, History of English Law, v. 5, p. 205-12; C.R.

Lovell, "The Reception of Defamation by the Common Law," 15
Vanderbilt

L. Rev. 1051-71 (1962).

61. It seems likely, for example, that the distinction between libel

per se and libel per quod can ultimately be traced to the canon law,
although the categories naturally underwent changes over the course of
time. But the early Common Law limited defamation per se to cases of
accusations of crimes (along with professional incompetence and a few
serious contagious diseases), and this may be because the canonical
remedy was taken over. Holdsworth concluded that categories other than
crimes were developed subsequently; see History of English Law, v. 8,
p. 348-49.

See also Milsom, Historical

Foundations,

337-38.

This content downloaded from 128.135.12.127 on Fri, 25 Apr 2014 13:04:38 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

